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The complexity of a board's roles (McNulty et al., 2013; Westphal, 1999) becomes apparent in the M&A context. While vigilant boards should constrain CEOs' ability to pursue disastrous deals, the board's effect on value-creating strategies is less clear. On one hand, vigilant boards should serve as a brake on managers' opportunity to pursue self-serving strategies (Stiles, 2001) . When the board faces a decision to accept, reject, or refer an M&A proposal, boards exercising their oversight function should be able to "ensure that something stupid is not being done, for example, somebody pursuing a major investment which clearly does not have a sensible financial return" (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999: 61) . On the other hand, however, a board's focus on vigilant monitoring may constrain the board's ability to effectively contribute to value-creating strategies, due to the inherent challenges of combining supervisory and control roles with advisory and collaborative roles (Baldenius, Melamud, and Meng, 2014; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003) . Westphal (1999) , for example, argues that friendship ties between directors and executives promote advice-seeking and could improve the quality of a firm's strategic decision making. Friendship ties also could undermine board's supervisory function, however, and specifically its objective monitoring of the CEO.
More time devoted by the board to supervisory activities may come at the expense of its advisory service (Baldenius et al., 2014) . For instance, Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) find that the majority of a board's time is spent on supervisory issues rather than on strategic ones. Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011) also report that an emphasis on monitoring by independent boards comes at the price of a weakened strategic advisory function, especially as it relates to acquisitions. Furthermore, directors' whose abilities and dispositions are honed for objective monitoring may not possess the abilities required for effective contributions to the firm's value-creating strategies. In order to contribute to strategic decision-making, directors need a familiarity with the company's operations and an in-depth understanding of its strategies and challenges (Stiles, 2001) . Outside directors' ability to contribute to the value-creation function of the firm could thus be constrained by information asymmetries relative to corporate insiders (Desender et al., 2013; Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010) and by the higher information costs these directors face in 6 understanding the implications of strategic decisions for the firm (Dalton et al., 2007; Westphal, 1999) . In addition to firm-specific knowledge, board effectiveness in decision-making requires collaboration (McNulty et al., 2013) . Directors may rationally seek to distance themselves from corporate managers, however, in order to enhance their ability to provide objective oversight (Faleye et al., 2011) . Finally, directors' participation in strategic decision-making blurs the boundaries between decision-making and decision-control, by requiring directors to provide objective oversight of the decisions they help to shape. This could also compromise decision accountability by shifting responsibility from the CEO to the board.
Rather than decrease the likelihood of value-destroying M&A deals directly, vigorous board oversight may reduce managerial willingness to take on those particularly risky deals that may have very good or very bad outcomes. From a managerial perspective, a strong focus on monitoring may intensify executives' defensiveness (Westphal, 1999) and create friction between the board and the CEO (Roberts, 2001) . CEOs may interpret vigilant monitoring as distrust, 'second-guessing' their decisions, or a "lack of respect for the position of the CEO" (McDonald and Westphal, 2010: 347) . CEOs could resist by controlling information flows (de Villiers, Naiker, and van Staden, 2011) or using impression management tactics (Westphal and Bednar, 2008) . Controls that constrain CEO discretion may not only shift the locus of control from executives to the board, but could also affect CEO motivation (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003: 405) . In an experimental study, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) find that monitoring decreases the performance of intrinsically motivated agents, with agents penalizing controlling principals when they perceive monitoring as a sign of distrust, lack of autonomy, or greed. Research also warns that tight financial controls could result in shortened time horizons and risk-avoidance behavior (Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill, 1991) . Finally, CEOs may become unwilling to discuss the firm's problems freely, so as not to admit their own limitations in solving them (Westphal, 1999) .
Although friendship ties between executives and directors could enhance CEOs' trust in their boards' support and thus encourage advice-seeking (Westphal, 1999) , a focus on monitoring could exacerbate CEOs "fears of 7 appearing uncertain or incompetent, or acknowledging dependence" (Roberts, 2001 (Roberts, : 1560 . CEOs thus may be less willing to seek board's advice when facing vigilant monitoring.
To summarize, board monitoring will affect M&A performance extremeness by reducing both bad deals and good ones. Although board monitoring should constrain value-destroying deals, monitoring is also likely to decrease the odds for big gains due to the inherent tensions between the board's oversight and advisory roles. Contributing to good corporate decisions requires less separation between management and board, with directors actively providing counsel, advice, and expertise in strategic decision-making and managers sharing information with the board and seeking directors' input (Hillman, 2005; Westphal, 1999) .
Vigilant monitoring, on the other hand, requires separation of decision making and control, and an impartial, more socially distant relationship between the board and the CEO (Westphal, 1999) , so as to constrain managerial influence and power over the board and to promote board's independence and objectivity in exercising oversight over managerial decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980) . Consequently, we expect that board monitoring will act as a double-edged sword, limiting the pursuit of both bad and good M&A deals.
Hypothesis 1: Board monitoring will be associated with less-extreme M&A returns, due to fewer big losses and fewer big gains.
Institutional shareholders. Institutional shareholders have a vested interest in monitoring M&A deals because M&As affect shareholder value. Large institutional shareholders, due to the size of their holdings, have more to lose and thus greater incentives to monitor, but they also are more likely to gain access to and receive special attention from management (Useem, 1996) . Schnatterly, Shaw, and Jennings (2008) , for instance, theorize and find that the largest institutional shareholder holds an information advantage and is better positioned to monitor the firm. Agency theory prescriptions are unclear, however, as to whether large shareholders' influence on corporate outcomes would constrain value-destroying deals and promote valuecreating ones, or whether their influence is more limited to the prevention of disastrous deals. On one hand, large, powerful and better-informed institutional investors are well positioned to monitor corporate executives 8 (e.g. Schnatterly et al., 2008) and to prevent value-destroying M&A deals, and they are motivated because they stand to lose more if an acquisition destroys shareholder value (e.g. Moeller et al., 2005; King et al., 2004) . Luo (2005) , for instance, reports that companies are more likely to backtrack and withdraw from proposed M&A deals when they are met with negative stock market reaction. On the other hand, increased accountability to the firm's shareholders may prompt corporate executives to engage in more conservative strategies, thus constraining not only big losses stemming from M&As, but also potentially constraining big gains. Although some scholars argue that increased accountability of corporate chiefs to their shareholders should encourage them to undertake more value-creating strategies that lead to overall improvements in firm performance (Bebchuk, 2005) , Jensen and Meckling (1976: 335) warn that solutions to agency problems could affect whether managers undertake high-or-low variance projects. If shareholder monitoring constrains a CEO's propensity to engage in high-variance projects, its success at preventing self-serving strategies that destroy value could come at the price of missing out on value-creating opportunities, for several reasons. ) could affect not only a CEO's career prospects at the current firm, but also limit their potential for leading another firm or serving on corporate boards. Finally, constraining managerial discretion in order to minimize agency costs may also constrain the upside potential that firms could realize from their executives' professional expertise, strategies, and firm-specific knowledge. The "delegation, or empowering one to act on behalf of another, is a sine qua non of the modern firm" (Sengul, Gimeno, and Dial, 2012: 376) . Falk and Kosfeld (2006) note, however, that agents exhibit control-averse behavior, and therefore that principal control negatively affects agent performance. They find that while monitoring constrains 'bad apples,' and thus improves the lower bounds of agent performance, it also imposes costs on the 'good apples' that bring down 9 the upper bounds of performance. In the M&A context, CEOs who jump on the M&A bandwagon later in the M&A wave (e.g. McNamara, Haleblian, and Dykes, 2008 ) may find it easier to justify their actions to the firm's shareholders. External legitimacy could come at a cost, however, if later movers face a more restricted set of potential partners (Carow, Heron, and Saxton, 2004) .
To summarize, vigilant monitoring by institutional shareholders should constrain the pursuit of valuedestroying deals, but could also narrow the set of strategic actions considered by a CEO. Institutional shareholders are likely to feel changes in shareholder wealth most acutely, and are also best positioned to monitor and discipline corporate executives. CEOs may prefer to tread lightly and favor strategies that are easy to justify to influential shareholders. Monitoring by large shareholders, therefore, could not only limit CEOs' ability to engage in value-destroying M&As, but it could also limit executives' risk-taking for valuecreating M&As. Thus: Dependent variable. Event study methodology has become the dominant method for measuring the impact of M&As on firm performance (Haleblian et al., 2009; King et al., 2004) . We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by following the Brown and Warner (1985) procedure 1 and aggregating ARs for the period of three days surrounding the announcement of the deal (Moeller et al., 2005) . While longer periods would ensure that all effects are captured, the estimates would be noisier (Weston, Siu, and Johnson, 2001 ).
Although widely used, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) have been criticized for failing to fully capture the wealth effect for acquiring firm shareholders (Malatesta, 1983; Moeller et al., 2005) . Moeller and colleagues (2005) find that although CARs estimated as percentage returns were not significantly different from zero, this number fails to reflect the extensive losses borne by acquiring firms' shareholders. As we are interested in the overall impact on shareholder wealth, we use abnormal dollar returns; we weight the percentage CARs with the firm's market value two days prior to the M&A announcement in order to estimate how much shareholders lose or gain overall as a result of the deal (e.g. Malatesta, 1983; Moeller et al., 2005) . Our dependent variable measures how extensively the particular M&A deal affects shareholder wealth. We took a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable to correct for skewness and kurtosis. Because this treatment estimates CEO propensity to 'swing for the fences' without regard whether it leads to shareholder losses or gains, in supplementary analyses we also split the sample into M&A losses and M&As gains.
Independent variables.
The ability of boards of directors to perform their monitoring duties has been a focal point in corporate governance research (Bergh et al., 2016; Dalton et al., 2007; Tuggle et al., 2010) .
We measure board monitoring in two ways. First, we examine board characteristics such as board independence and size, CEO duality -the absence of a separate (non-executive) chairperson of the board, directors' ownership in the focal firm, directors' equity based pay, prior experience with M&As, and how busy directors were with appointments on other boards (online appendix 4). Second, in order to account for board variables acting as a bundle, and thus the potential substitute or complementary impact of various board measures (i.e. Dalton et al., 2003) , we conducted a factor analysis, and include an aggregate measure of 1 , where we estimated the parameters by regressing the firm's returns on market returns for a period of 240 to 40 days preceding the announcement of the M&A event (Mueller and Sirower, 2003) .
board monitoring. Institutional ownership concentration is measured as the percentage of total year-end shares owned by the top five institutional investors (Sauerwald, Lin and Peng, 2016; Hartzell and Starks, 2003) . These data came from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database.
Controls.
We control for number of factors that could affect either M&A propensity or returns: firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of firm assets; growth opportunities -market value/book value of equity (Wright et al., 1996) ; prior performance -ROA; related acquisitions in the same two-digit SIC industry (King et al., 2004) ; deal value logarithmically transformed to correct for skewness and kurtosis; M&A experience of the acquiring firm in the prior 3 years (Laamanen and Keil, 2008) ; free cash flows -operating cash flows scaled by assets (Carow et al., 2004) ; corporate diversification -Herfindahl index, leverage -longterm debt divided by total assets (e.g. Sauerwald, et al.,, 2016) , and relative size of the deal. Furthermore, we control for CEO characteristics and governance environment, such as the CEO career horizon -the number of years the CEO has until reaching the age of 70 (Matta and Beamish, 2008) ; CEO gender, as it could affect risk-taking (Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer, 1999) ; CEO stock options -Black-Scholes value of the options granted to the CEO, divided by the total compensation for a 3-year period (Sanders and Hambrick, 2007) ; CEO ownership -percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO at the end of each year; CEO confidence in the firm -CEOs' pattern of holding and exercising their stock options (Campbell et al., 2011);  and antitakeover provisions -an indicator variable if GIM index is equal to or higher than 10, as takeover provisions could protect entrenched CEOs (Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell, 2012) . Finally, as CEO's latitude of action could be affected by the firm's industry or macro environment, we include year and industry effects, and control for industry munificence, dynamism, and complexity (Boyd, 1995) at the 4-digit SIC level.
We measure all explanatory and control variables, other than the focal deal traits, at the end of the year preceding the M&A event. Variance inflation factors revealed that multicolinearity is not problematic.
Below we report the results using three different methodologies. 
RESULTS
Summary statistics and correlations are provided in Table 1 . Consistent with prior research (e.g., Moeller et al., 2005) , we find that CARs by themselves do not reflect M&As' impact on shareholder wealth. By taking the absolute values of the dollar-adjusted abnormal returns, we measure how extreme the effect of the M&A deal is on shareholder wealth, irrespective of whether the effect is value-creating or value-destroying. Table 1 and Table 2 about Table 2, Interpreting from OLS model 2, a one percent increase in institutional ownership concentration, leads to a $22 million reduction in the stock market swing (positive or negative) to the deal announcement. Bushee (1998) argued that interest in monitoring by institutional investors varied by type of manager, thus we calculated firm ownership by each class of institutional owner using his classification. In supplementary analyses, we replaced institutional ownership concentration with percent of firm holding by each type of manager. The results (available in online appendix 1) were consistent with dedicated institutional ownership negatively influencing performance extremeness across all models. Furthermore, we also examine the effects of monitoring separately for M&A deals that destroy shareholder wealth (online appendix 2) and deals that create value for shareholders (online appendix 3). These results indicate that the impact of monitoring on extreme performance is not due solely to constraining shareholder losses.
DISCUSSION
This study contributes to the literature on corporate governance by explicitly considering both the benefits and costs of monitoring mechanisms. We find that monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders is associated with lower M&A losses, but also with lower M&A gains -that is, board monitoring does not promote a universal, 'raising all boats' shift towards better performance. Although monitoring reduces executives' propensities to make excessively risky M&A investments, it also serves as a double-edged sword.
On one hand, monitoring can eliminate behaviors that should not occur, such as self-interested CEOs 14 destroying or expropriating shareholder value. On the other hand, monitoring also can constrain behaviors that shareholders favor -those that could create shareholder value. Therefore, rather than constraining lossinducing risks and promoting gain-worthy ones, monitoring seems to constrain the investment options considered by the CEOs, thereby eliminating both very good and very bad 'apples'.
Our study is not without limitations. Despite attempts to be comprehensive in our selection of board variables, including robustness checks with additional board-related measures, our use of archival data limits our ability to capture the effectiveness of board monitoring and the social, political, and psychological Jensen and Meckling (1976) warned that solutions to agency problems come at a cost. Our findings -that board and shareholder monitoring constrains both big losses and big gains -indicates one such cost.
Given these findings, is the pursuit of a direct link between monitoring and firm performance a 'false grail ?' 3 Or, might the equivocal relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance reported by prior research (Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Dalton et al., 2003 Dalton et al., , 2007 be driven by inappropriate, 'one-size-fits-all' approaches to corporate governance (Wowak and Hambrick, 2010) that fail to account for factors like CEOs' values, capabilities, and intrinsic motivation? Although agency theory is the dominant perspective in corporate governance research (Dalton et al., 2007) , it is inherently a financial, and not a strategic, theory (Bettis, 1983) . In its preoccupation with the redistribution of firm value between managers 15 and shareholders, agency theory fails to offer principle-based propositions for creating sustainable corporate value. On one hand, vigilant monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders could help companies avoid situations such as HP's acquisition of Autonomy, where four-fifths of the M&A price was subsequently written down. On the other hand, the prevention of value destruction should not come at the cost of limiting M&As and other strategic undertakings that could build and strengthen the firm's competitive position (e.g. Chatterjee, 1986) . Contrary to widely held beliefs, our results indicate that constraining executives' ability to pursue value-destroying M&A deals does not simultaneously encourage or enable CEOs to pursue value-creating deals. No single study, however, can provide conclusive evidence. Future research investigating how governance could limit the potential for bad or self-serving managerial decisions, while encouraging strategies that create long-term shareholder value would be of great value. 15 -0.16 -0.08 -0.26 -0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.07 -0.19 0.11 -0.15 -0.09 -0 7 -0.38 -0.31 -0.22 -0.15 0.07 -0.11 -0.22 -0.14 -0.06 
